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JAIL ISOLATION AFTER KINGSLEY:  
ABOLISHING SOLITARY CONFINEMENT 
AT THE INTERSECTION 
OF PRETRIAL INCARCERATION 
AND EMERGING ADULTHOOD 
Deema Nagib* 
 
In 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court held that allegations of excessive use of 
force in pretrial detention are subject to an objective standard.  However, it 
is unclear whether the objective standard extends to claims arising out of 
different factual circumstances.  The Second Circuit’s recent decision in 
Darnell v. Pineiro to extend Kingsley v. Hendrickson to conditions-of-
confinement cases provides hope.  This Note argues that Kingsley should 
extend to solitary confinement litigation—particularly the isolation of 
emerging adults in pretrial detention.  Solitary confinement is a widespread 
practice in the criminal justice system, but the implications of its use in 
pretrial detention have not been fully explored.  Since its inception, solitary 
confinement has demonstrated adverse psychological and physiological 
effects.  Emerging adults are most likely to be exposed to the practice and 
are more vulnerable to its effects.  Incarcerated emerging adults who are 
held awaiting trial already experience a significant disruption in their social 
and emotional development.  This Note draws from psychological 
scholarship, arguing that isolating emerging adults in pretrial detention 
causes irreparable harm to their well-being—harm so severe that it amounts 
to unconstitutional punishment.  Finally, this Note proposes a solution to this 
mass problem:  abolishing solitary confinement for emerging adults who are 
incarcerated pretrial. 
  
 
*  J.D. Candidate, 2018, Fordham University School of Law; B.S., Applied Psychology, 2014, 
New York University. I would like to thank Professor Michael W. Martin for his guidance 
throughout this process.  I would also like to thank the Fordham Law Review editors and staff 
for all of their help.  Finally, I would like to dedicate this Note to everyone who is currently 
or formerly incarcerated.  I constantly strive to be a better listener first and advocate second. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that you are locked in a six-by-eight-foot cell for close to twenty-
three hours per day—for days, weeks, or months.1  When you wake up, you 
see a toilet.2  Your cellmates are roaches and rodents, and the noise is 
incessant.3  Late at night, people yell.4  There is little to no natural light.5  It 
 
 1. See Trey Bundy, Sixteen, Alone, 23 Hours a Day, in a Six-by-Eight-Foot Box, MEDIUM 
(Mar. 5, 2014), https://medium.com/solitary-lives/sixteen-alone-23-hours-a-day-in-a-six-by-
eight-foot-box-26ab1e09632d#.4hst619c0 [http://perma.cc/69RV-NWB8]. 
 2. See Dana Goldstein et al., This Is Rikers:  From the People Who Live and Work There, 
MARSHALL PROJECT (June 28, 2015, 9:00 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/06/ 
28/this-is-rikers [http://perma.cc/DHG3-RVFT]. 
 3. See id. 
 4. See id. 
 5. N.Y.C. JAILS ACTION COAL., PETITION TO THE NEW YORK CITY BOARD OF CORRECTION 
FOR ADOPTION OF RULES REGARDING THE USE OF ISOLATED CONFINEMENT 18 (2013), 
http://nycjac.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/JAC-Petition-to-BOC-for-Rule-Making-and-
Reform-of-Solitary-Confinement-2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/J396-GLKS]. 
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smells of “body odor and human waste.”6  You must be escorted anytime you 
wish to leave your cell.7  To add to the distress, imagine you are between the 
ages of eighteen and twenty-five and have not been convicted of a crime. 
Throughout all of this you feel hopeless, lonely, and depressed.8  Maybe 
you think about committing suicide.9  Maybe you attempt suicide.10  This is 
solitary confinement. 
Isolation alone is enough to cause a person to deteriorate mentally, 
emotionally, and physically.11  Isolation during a critical phase of 
development and an especially traumatic phase of the criminal justice process 
can further this deterioration.12 
In 1971, Richard G. Singer wrote: 
 It seems remarkable that, in this the last third of the twentieth century, 
we still send men to small dank closets, deprive them of human 
companionship, sanitary needs, and clothing, feed them on a starvation diet, 
force them to sleep on thin mattresses, and then, after an unspecified period, 
remove them from this environment and proceed in the hope that they have 
been “rehabilitated.”13 
In the beginning of the twenty-first century, this practice is still 
widespread.14  The long-lasting, detrimental effects of solitary confinement 
are well documented.15  Solitary confinement as a penal practice was 
scrutinized by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture,16 President 
 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at 17–18. 
 8. Id. 
 9. See id. at 18. 
 10. See Jennifer Gonnerman, Kalief Browder Learned How to Commit Suicide on Rikers, 
NEW YORKER (June 2, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/kalief-browder-
learned-how-to-commit-suicide-on-rikers [http://perma.cc/KQP7-3H6W]. 
 11. See infra Part I.B. 
 12. See generally Jessica Lee, Note, Lonely Too Long:  Redefining and Reforming 
Juvenile Solitary Confinement, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 845 (2016) (arguing that individuals 
between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five should be included in the broader push to 
eliminate or limit juvenile solitary confinement in the prison system). 
 13. Richard G. Singer, Confining Solitary Confinement:  Constitutional Arguments for a 
“New Penology,” 56 IOWA L. REV. 1251, 1251 (1971). 
 14. ALLEN J. BECK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, USE OF RESTRICTIVE HOUSING IN U.S. PRISONS 
AND JAILS, 2011–12, at 4 (2015), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/urhuspj1112.pdf 
(showing that approximately 18 percent of people incarcerated in jails and 20 percent of people 
incarcerated in prisons spent time in solitary confinement in a twelve-month period or since 
their arrival at the facility) [http://perma.cc/U9AP-WAHX]. 
 15. See infra Part I.B. 
 16. See Juan E. Méndez (Special Rapporteur on Torture), Interim Rep. of the Special 
Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, ¶¶ 79–81, U.N. Doc. A/66/268 (Aug. 5, 2011) (“The Special 
Rapporteur stresses that solitary confinement is a harsh measure which may cause serious 
psychological and physiological adverse effects on individuals.”); see also G.A. Res. 70/175, 
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (Nelson Mandela Rules), at 17 (Jan. 
8, 2016) (“Solitary confinement shall be used only in exceptional cases as a last resort, for as 
short a time as possible . . . .”).  
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Obama,17 and the U.S. Supreme Court.18  Regrettably, the use of solitary 
confinement in local jails across the United States has not been similarly 
critiqued.19 
Jails represent an important stage in the criminal justice system:  the first 
point of exposure to incarceration.20  Despite their importance, they have 
“remained largely under the radar of researchers and policy analysts alike.”21  
Isolation during pretrial incarceration is “likely to significantly compound 
and worsen the already painful psychological transition from the freeworld 
to penal confinement.”22 
The traumatic combination of isolation and pretrial incarceration is even 
worse during emerging adulthood.  The vocal movement to abolish solitary 
confinement in prisons and jails for youth has largely focused on juveniles 
under the age of eighteen.23  However, research demonstrates that 
designating the age of eighteen as a marker of legal adulthood is largely 
arbitrary.24  Development exists on a continuum, and people continue to 
develop through their midtwenties.25 
Emerging adulthood, a critical developmental phase, is especially 
important in the critique of solitary confinement during pretrial 
incarceration.26  Incarcerated emerging adults represent “‘the perfect storm’ 
of the potential perils of this developmental period.”27  Notably, people 
between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four are most likely to spend time 
 
 17. See Peter Baker, Obama Calls for Effort to Fix a ‘Broken System’ of Criminal Justice, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/15/us/politics/obama-calls-for-
effort-to-fix-a-broken-system-of-criminal-justice.html [http://perma.cc/X4GR-PFYY].  
 18. See, e.g., Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2208–09 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(addressing an issue that had no bearing on the legal question before the Court to emphasize 
the “human toll” of solitary confinement); see also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978) 
(“Confinement in . . . an isolation cell is a form of punishment subject to scrutiny under Eighth 
Amendment standards.”). 
 19. See Craig Haney et al., Examining Jail Isolation:  What We Don’t Know Can Be 
Profoundly Harmful, 96 PRISON J. 126, 134 (2015) (reporting that there is an “absence of 
reliable data about exactly how often jail isolation is used, for how long, and with what 
effect”). 
 20. Id. at 131 (referring to jails as “first responder” correctional facilities in the criminal 
justice system). 
 21. Loïc Wacquant, Class, Race & Hyperincarceration in Revanchist America, 139 
DAEDALUS 74, 75 (2010). 
 22. Haney et al., supra note 19, at 143. 
 23. See Tamar R. Birckhead, Children in Isolation:  The Solitary Confinement of Youth, 
50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (2015); Anthony Giannetti, Note, The Solitary Confinement of 
Juveniles in Adult Jails and Prisons:  A Cruel and Unusual Punishment?, 30 BUFF. PUB. INT. 
L.J. 31 (2012).  But see Lee, supra note 12 (explaining the effects of solitary confinement on 
incarcerated emerging adults in prisons). 
 24. See infra Part I.C. 
 25. See Barbara L. Atwell, Rethinking the Childhood-Adult Divide:  Meeting the Mental 
Health Needs of Emerging Adults, 25 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 15 (2015). 
 26. The Jails Action Coalition, a New York City-based advocacy group, advocated for the 
exclusion of emerging adults from solitary confinement because of the population’s 
heightened vulnerability to the practice.  See N.Y.C. JAILS ACTION COAL., supra note 5, at 16. 
 27. Kristyn Zajac et al., Juvenile Justice, Mental Health, and the Transition to Adulthood:  
A Review of Service System Involvement and Unmet Needs in the U.S., 56 CHILD. & YOUTH 
SERVICES REV. 139, 140 (2015). 
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in solitary confinement while incarcerated in local jails.28  Given the unique 
vulnerabilities of emerging adults,29 the practice of solitary confinement is 
likely to be ineffective in disciplining individuals and maintaining safety, and 
it simultaneously exacerbates detrimental health effects.30 
New York City has officially eliminated the use of pretrial solitary 
confinement—or “punitive segregation”—for individuals under the age of 
twenty-one.31  While this is a welcome improvement, there is already fear 
that the New York City Department of Correction is beginning to replace the 
practice with ad hoc solitary confinement units and new, equally restrictive 
conditions.32  In addition, ending the practice for individuals under the age 
of twenty-one does not encompass the rest of the population most vulnerable 
to its use.33 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly confirmed that people who are 
incarcerated pretrial34 receive a different level of constitutional protection 
than people who have been convicted.35  Under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, people who are incarcerated pretrial have a substantive due 
process right to be free from punishment.36  Under the Eighth Amendment, 
 
 28. See BECK, supra note 14, at 4 (showing that 24.8 percent of those between the ages of 
eighteen and nineteen and 23.4 percent of those between the ages of twenty and twenty-four 
spent time in a restricted housing unit between 2011 and 2012). 
 29. See infra Part I.C. 
 30. See infra Part I.B. 
 31. See Irene Plagianos, Solitary Confinement for Prisoners Under 21 Scrapped in New 
York City, DNAINFO (Oct. 12, 2016, 9:19 AM), https://www.dnainfo.com/new-
york/20161012/civic-center/punitive-segregation-solitary-confinement-ends-teens-young-
people (“New York has become the first city in the nation to end solitary confinement for all 
inmates under the age of 21.”) [http://perma.cc/L4B9-TVWT]. 
 32. See, e.g., Letter Regarding Notice of Violation of Minimum Standards at West Facility 
from Stanley Brezenoff, Chair, N.Y.C. Bd. of Corr., to Joseph Ponte, Comm’r, N.Y.C. 
Dep’t of Corr. (Sept. 29, 2016), http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/boc/downloads/pdf/ 
News/2016.09.29%20-%20Letters%20from%20BOC%20to%20DOC%20re%20West%20 
Facility%20Violations.pdf (finding that an ad hoc solitary confinement unit, West Facility, 
was in operation and that people were sent there without any due process) 
[http://perma.cc/V4KB-UDJ2]; see also Erin Corbett, New York Corrections Head Defends 
Chaining Rikers Inmates to Desks for 7 Hours a Day, RAW STORY (Jan. 18, 2017, 6:30 PM), 
https://www.rawstory.com/2017/01/new-york-corrections-head-defends-chaining-rikers-
inmates-to-desks-for-7-hours-a-day/ (reporting that after young adults were barred from 
punitive segregation on Rikers Island, administrators approved a practice of shackling them 
by their ankles and chaining them to desks for the seven hours that they are entitled to be 
outside of their cells) [http://perma.cc/CY6Y-DW8Y]. 
 33. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 34. Person-first language is used throughout this Note rather than “prisoner,” “inmate,” or 
“detainee.”  To the extent that such words are used, they are in direct quotes.  For more 
information about person-first language, see Eddie Ellis, An Open Letter to Our Friends on 
the Question of Language, CTR. FOR NULEADERSHIP ON URB. SOLUTIONS (Nov. 
2013), http://centerfornuleadership.org/cnus/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/CNUS-lang-ltr_ 
regular.pdf [http://perma.cc/PLH4-2B82]. 
 35. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473–74 (2015) (holding that claims 
brought by people incarcerated pretrial are subject to an objective standard); Sandin v. Conner, 
515 U.S. 472, 484–85 (1995) (dismissing a convicted person’s claim that he is entitled to the 
same liberty protections as people who are incarcerated pretrial); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 
520, 535–36 (1979) (holding that people incarcerated pretrial have a substantive due process 
right to be free from punishment). 
 36. See infra Part II.B. 
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people who are incarcerated following a conviction have a right to be free 
from cruel and unusual punishment.37  Despite the shared experience of 
incarceration, it is logical to differentiate between the legal rights of those 
who have been convicted from those who are languishing in local jails despite 
their legally presumed innocence.38 
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has been murky,39 and many circuit 
courts have historically applied the Eighth Amendment to claims brought by 
people incarcerated pretrial.40  In Kingsley v. Hendrickson,41 the Supreme 
Court held that the standard for excessive use of force in pretrial detention is 
objective.42  This holding provides room to argue that an objective standard 
should extend to other factual circumstances.43  In fact, the Second Circuit 
recently held that Kingsley’s objective standard applies to conditions-of-
confinement claims.44  As the issue percolates through the circuits, a risk still 
remains that other courts will analyze claims that fall outside the factual 
contours of Kingsley under the Eighth Amendment.45 
This Note, echoing much of the Second Circuit’s recent opinion, argues 
that courts should extend Kingsley’s holding to emerging adults’ exposure to 
solitary confinement in pretrial detention.  Specifically, this Note argues that 
the intersection of pretrial incarceration, solitary confinement, and emerging 
adulthood is uniquely dangerous.  Part I addresses and explains each factor 
of this intersection.  Then, Part II explains the Supreme Court cases that 
delineate the rights afforded to people who are incarcerated.  Finally, Part III 
offers a solution to reducing the harmful effects of pretrial incarceration 
during emerging adulthood:  abolishing solitary confinement.  It argues 
further that subjecting emerging adults to solitary confinement during pretrial 
incarceration is unconstitutional punishment that is objectively unreasonable 
and excessive in relation to its stated governmental purpose. 
I.  BACKGROUND:  
A DANGEROUS CONVERGENCE OF FACTORS 
The combination of pretrial detention and emerging adulthood presents a 
unique challenge to the practice of solitary confinement.  Before delving into 
 
 37. See infra Part II.A. 
 38. The author does not intend to justify, by virtue of their conviction, the use of solitary 
confinement for people who have been convicted of a crime.  This Note’s purpose is simply 
to respond to a newly created opportunity to advocate for its abolition in a particular context. 
 39. See generally Catherine T. Struve, The Conditions of Pretrial Detention, 161 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1009 (2013). 
 40. See infra Part II.C. 
 41. 135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015). 
 42. Id. at 2472. 
 43. See infra Part III. 
 44. Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 30 (2d Cir. 2017). 
 45. See, e.g., Kyla Magun, Note, A Changing Landscape for Pretrial Detainees?:  The 
Potential Impact of Kingsley v. Hendrickson on Jail-Suicide Litigation, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 
2059, 2083–84 (2016) (responding to the confusion over whether Kingsley was actually 
intended to apply to other claims and arguing that Kingsley’s holding should extend to jail 
suicide litigation). 
2017] JAIL ISOLATION AFTER KINGSLEY 2921 
the constitutional rights afforded to individuals incarcerated pretrial, this part 
explains each component of this dangerous convergence in more detail. 
A.  Jails Matter:  
Pretrial Incarceration as an Entry Point 
Jails and prisons are often conflated.46  Both prisons and jails incarcerate 
people, but they are distinct entities.  First, jails are primarily locally funded 
and operated.47  As such, they are “subject to local political agendas.”48  The 
local nature of jails’ operation also suggests that a wide variety of 
institutional practices exist across the country and uniformity is unlikely.49 
Second, given the “transience of the jail population,”50 jails incarcerate a 
significant number of people per year.  In 2015, approximately 10.9 million 
people were admitted to local jails across the country and approximately 
721,300 were housed in jails per day.51  On average, jails admit 
approximately 12 million people per year52 and hold approximately 731,000 
individuals per day.53  Prisons, by contrast, hold approximately twice the 
number of people as jails on a given day,54 but they admit significantly fewer 
per year.55  Not surprisingly, jails have a much larger impact on society than 
prisons do.56 
 
 46. See, e.g., RAM SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, INCARCERATION’S FRONT 
DOOR:  THE MISUSE OF JAILS IN AMERICA 4 (2015), https://storage.googleapis.com/vera-web-
assets/downloads/Publications/incarcerations-front-door-the-misuse-of-jails-in-america/ 
legacy_downloads/incarcerations-front-door-report_02.pdf [http://perma.cc/K8FK-YKRL]. 
 47. See Jeanne B. Stinchcomb et al., Moving Toward Utopia:  Visions of Progress for 
American Jails, 28 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 23, 30 (2012); see also AMANDA PETTERUTI & 
NASTASSIA WALSH, JUSTICE POLICY INST., JAILING COMMUNITIES:  THE IMPACT OF JAIL 
EXPANSION AND EFFECTIVE PUBLIC SAFETY STRATEGIES 5 (2008), http:// 
www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/08-04_rep_jailingcommunities_ac.pdf (“Jails are 
correctional facilities operated and funded by counties and localities, and they are usually 
centrally located in a community.”) [http://perma.cc/MYP6-WSXZ]. 
 48. Stinchcomb et al., supra note 47, at 30. 
 49. See Rick Ruddell & G. Larry Mays, Rural Jails:  Problematic Inmates, Overcrowded 
Cells, and Cash-Strapped Counties, 35 J. CRIM. JUST. 251, 252 (2007) (“Jails within the United 
States ranged in size from only four or five beds, to the Los Angeles jail system that housed 
an average of 18,693 inmates from October to December 2005.”); see also David C. May et 
al., Going to Jail Sucks (and It Really Doesn’t Matter Who You Ask), 39 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 
250, 251 (2013) (“Jail operations vary considerably.”). 
 50. See Haney et al., supra note 19, at 132. 
 51. TODD D. MINTON & ZHEN ZENG, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JAIL INMATES IN 2015, at 1 
(2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ji15.pdf [http://perma.cc/2B2S-5HFG]. 
 52. See Arthur J. Lurigio, Jails in the United States:  The “Old-New” Frontier in 
American Corrections, 96 PRISON J. 3, 3 (2016); see also SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 46, 
at 46. 
 53. SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 46, at 4. 
 54. See, e.g., E. ANN CARSON & ELIZABETH ANDERSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS 
IN 2015, at 1 (2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p15.pdf (reporting that 1,526,800 
people were confined in prisons at the end of 2015) [https://perma.cc/39AC-NW22]. 
 55. See id. at 10 (reporting that 608,300 people were admitted to prisons in 2015).  
 56. See PETTERUTI & WALSH, supra note 47, at 15 (“[M]any people reenter the community 
from jail every day. . . .  As a result, people in jails often have many interactions with the 
community around the jail facility, in a way that people held in prisons do not.  This has 
implications for the health and well-being of the people in the jail as well as of the people in 
the community.”); see also Haney et al., supra note 19, at 129 (“[T]he social and psychic 
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Third, jails and prisons typically serve different populations.  People 
incarcerated in state and federal prisons have been convicted of a crime and 
are typically serving sentences that are greater than one year.57  People 
incarcerated in jails are typically awaiting trial or are serving a sentence of 
under one year.58  Most people in jails have been arrested but not convicted 
of any crime.59  These individuals are “legally presumed innocent.”60 
While pretrial release decisions are supposed to be made based on factors 
such as risk of flight and community safety,61 low-risk individuals who are 
too poor to afford bail are increasingly likely to remain in jail while high-risk 
individuals who can afford bail are more likely to be released.62  The Vera 
Institute of Justice found that 54 percent of individuals incarcerated in New 
York City jails remained incarcerated “because they could not afford bail of 
$2,500 or less.”63 
Jails tend to incarcerate vulnerable people.  They are “repositor[ies]” of 
the mentally ill,64 the poor,65 and communities of color,66 and their conditions 
have far-reaching ripple effects.  Most people who are incarcerated are 
eventually released, and the psychological, social, emotional, and physical 
effects of incarceration in general, and solitary confinement in particular, 
have implications for society as a whole.67 
The Department of Justice found that approximately 18 percent of 
individuals who were incarcerated in local jails spent time in solitary 
 
‘footprint’ of conditions and practices in jails is broader if not necessarily deeper than for 
prisons.”); Wacquant, supra note 21, at 75 (“[J]ails create more social disruption and family 
turmoil . . . than do prisons.”). 
 57. See PETTERUTI & WALSH, supra note 47, at 5; see also CARSON & ANDERSON, supra 
note 54, at 6 (reporting that approximately 97 percent of the prison population in 2015 was 
sentenced to more than one year in prison).  
 58. SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 46, at 6. 
 59. See id. (estimating that approximately three out of five individuals incarcerated in jails 
across the United States are incarcerated pretrial). 
 60. Id. at 4–5. 
 61. See, e.g., Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (2012); United States v. Salerno, 
481 U.S. 739, 742 (1987) (upholding the Bail Reform Act’s provision that individuals charged 
with an offense may be held if a judicial officer reasonably believes that it is necessary to 
assure appearance at trial or necessary for community safety); see also SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., 
supra note 46, at 4. 
 62. SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 46, at 32. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See Linda A. Teplin, The Prevalence of Severe Mental Disorder Among Male Urban 
Jail Detainees:  Comparison with the Epidemiologic Catchment Area Program, 80 AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH 663, 663 (1990); see also Jillian Peterson & Kevin Heinz, Understanding Offenders 
with Serious Mental Illness in the Criminal Justice System, 42 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 
537, 538 (2016) (explaining that “[t]he Los Angeles County jail system is one of the largest 
mental health treatment facilities in the country”). See generally Melissa Kong, Cook County 
Jail:  A De Facto Hospital for the Mentally Ill, 19 LOY. PUB. INT. L. REP. 141 (2014). 
 65. See SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 46, at 4. 
 66. See id. at 11; see also PETTERUTI & WALSH, supra note 47, at 4. See generally Jonathan 
Oberman & Kendea Johnson, Broken Windows:  Restoring Social Order or Damaging and 
Depleting New York’s Poor Communities of Color?, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 931 (2016). 
 67. See Mika’il DeVeaux, The Trauma of the Incarceration Experience, 48 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 257, 264 (2013). 
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confinement in a twelve-month period.68  This practice, which has been 
described as “criminality at one of its highest levels”69 and “solely punitive[,] 
[without] any health or safety justification,”70 deserves increased attention 
when individuals who have not been convicted of a crime are at risk of 
developing long-lasting detrimental health effects. 
B.  Solitary Confinement:  Creating Madness 
Solitary confinement typically consists of isolation in a “windowless cell 
[that is] no larger than a typical parking spot”71 for twenty-two to twenty-
four hours per day.72  A quintessential characteristic of the practice is 
“extreme sensory deprivation.”73  Individuals placed in solitary confinement 
are often “allowed little or no opportunity for conversation or interaction with 
anyone” in the limited time that they are allowed outside of their cells.74 
Initially established as a tool for criminal justice reform,75 solitary 
confinement is now used primarily for security purposes.76  Despite judicial 
deference to jail and prison administrators,77 research demonstrates that the 
practice is more likely to cause long-lasting, sometimes permanent, adverse 
health effects than to increase institutional order and security. 
 
 68. See BECK, supra note 14, at 4 (reporting that 18.1 percent of people incarcerated in 
prisons spent time in solitary confinement in a twelve-month period). 
 69. Thomas B. Benjamin & Kenneth Lux, Solitary Confinement as Psychological 
Punishment, 13 CAL. W. L. REV. 265, 296 (1977). 
 70. Shira E. Gordon, Note, Solitary Confinement, Public Safety, and Recidivism, 47 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 495, 526 (2014). 
 71. Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2208 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 72. See, e.g., Cedric Richmond, Toward a More Constitutional Approach to Solitary 
Confinement:  The Case for Reform, 52 HARV. J. LEGIS. 1, 2 (2015); see also G.A. Res. 70/175, 
supra note 16, at 17 (defining solitary confinement as isolation for twenty-two or more hours 
per day). 
 73. Mariam Hinds & John Butler, Solitary Confinement:  Can the Courts Get Inmates out 
of the Hole?, 11 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 331, 332 (2015). 
 74. Davis, 135 S. Ct. at 2208 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 75. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH:  THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 236 (Alan 
Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977). 
 76. See ALISON SHAMES ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, SOLITARY CONFINEMENT:  
COMMON MISCONCEPTIONS AND EMERGING SAFE ALTERNATIVES 4 (2015), 
http://archive.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/solitary-confinement-
misconceptions-safe-alternatives-report.pdf (explaining that solitary confinement is “used by 
corrections officials in the United States today, largely as a means to fulfill a prison or jail’s 
top priority:  the safety of its staff and the incarcerated people under its care”) 
[http://perma.cc/L29N-P2GR]. 
 77. See Eric Berger, Individual Rights, Judicial Deference, and Administrative Law 
Norms in Constitutional Decision Making, 91 B.U. L. REV. 2029, 2045–47 (2011); see also 
Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2474 (2015) (“[A] court must take account of the 
legitimate interests in managing a jail, acknowledging as part of the objective reasonableness 
analysis that deference to policies and practices needed to maintain order and institutional 
security is appropriate.”); Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011) (“Courts must be 
sensitive to . . . the need for deference to experienced and expert prison administrators faced 
with the difficult and dangerous task of housing large numbers of convicted criminals.”); 
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84–85 (1987) (“Running a prison is an inordinately difficult 
undertaking that requires expertise, planning, and the commitment of resources, all of which 
are peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive branches of government.”). 
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1.  Justification and Effects on Institutional Violence 
Solitary confinement was first introduced to reform criminal 
punishment.78  The practice’s proponents were concerned with the barbaric 
nature of criminal punishment as a public spectacle.79  In the early nineteenth 
century, isolation was “intended to redeem the soul through quiet 
contemplation.”80  However, the practice’s justifications have shifted over 
time.  As one scholar noted, solitary confinement has “changed from an open, 
optimistic experiment in social reform into a hidden, secretive place of 
punishment and control.”81 
Today, jail administrators primarily support the use of solitary 
confinement as a security measure.  Administrators and officers must be able 
to effectively manage their facilities,82 and solitary confinement provides 
officers with an easy-to-enforce sanction for the violation of disciplinary 
rules.83  Jails cannot refuse admission.84  They house populations that are 
transient and often in crisis.85  Thus, correction officers are forced to make 
choices about how to care for a variety of individuals who may pose a threat 
to institutional safety, often without sufficient time to deliberate.86 
Correction officers are, first and foremost, concerned with assaults on staff 
and other people who are incarcerated.87  Marc Steier, the director of legal 
affairs for the Correction Officers’ Benevolent Association, justified solitary 
confinement by explaining that he does not know of another way to deal 
 
 78. See FOUCAULT, supra note 75, at 236. 
 79. See JOSHUA M. PRICE, PRISON AND SOCIAL DEATH 93 (2015) (explaining that examples 
of public punishment that used to characterize the criminal justice system are “the stocks, the 
pillory, the ducking or cucking stool, public flogging, and transport, . . . hanging and other 
forms of public execution”). 
 80. Id. at 92. 
 81. Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL’Y 325, 343 (2006). 
 82. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979) (“Prison administrators . . . should 
be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices 
that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain 
institutional security.”); see also Turner, 482 U.S. at 89 (justifying judicial deference because 
“an inflexible strict scrutiny analysis would seriously hamper [prison officials’] ability to 
anticipate security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable problems of 
prison administration”). 
 83. See generally SCARLET KIM ET AL., N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, BOXED IN:  THE TRUE 
COST OF EXTREME ISOLATION IN NEW YORK’S PRISONS (2012), https://www.nyclu.org/ 
sites/default/files/publications/nyclu_boxedin_FINAL.pdf [http://perma.cc/BM84-7UKR]. 
 84. See, e.g., Stinchcomb et al., supra note 47, at 28. 
 85. See, e.g., Haney et al., supra note 19, at 131. 
 86. See May et al., supra note 49, at 253 (“In addition to places of violence and idleness, 
jail staff are challenged by the broad range of offenders they must supervise.”); see also Haney 
et al., supra note 19, at 134 (“[People who are incarcerated in local jails] are an especially 
complex and challenging population for jail staff to effectively monitor and control.  When 
combined with the relative lack of support staff to whom they can turn, the high turnover of 
inmates, and the typically very limited range of classification, alternative housing, and 
management options at their disposal, there is a high likelihood that jail guards will employ 
forceful, punitive responses to inmate conflict and misconduct.  Isolation can easily become a 
normative response in such environments.”). 
 87. See, e.g., Wacquant, supra note 21, at 75 (writing that “minimiz[ing] violent 
incidents” is a “top priorit[y] of jail wardens”). 
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“with people who have assaulted staff 20, 40, 60 times.”88  He believes that 
the solution is simple:  “[I]f I can’t reach you, I can’t attack you.”89 
Isolation, in Steier’s mind, is a regulatory mechanism to ensure that the 
most dangerous people do not have access to others.90  However, justifying 
solitary confinement as an instrument necessary to reduce levels of 
institutional violence is likely “unsubstantiated.”91  First, it is important to 
clarify that the use of solitary confinement is not exclusively reserved for 
people who pose a serious threat to institutional safety.92  Second, research 
suggests that solitary confinement does not decrease levels of institutional 
violence.  One researcher has found that solitary confinement has no effect 
on violence—overall levels of violence in his study neither increased nor 
decreased.93  Others have found that solitary confinement actually increases 
violence.94  In some instances, isolation will drive people to throw “feces, 
urine, and/or semen” at officers.95  Isolation can also lead to “uncontrollable 
outbursts of anger, rage and aggression.”96  The penal response to such 
behavior is more time in solitary confinement, creating a feedback loop 
where institutionally unacceptable conduct is met with a sanction that tends 
to increase the likelihood that the conduct will recur.97 
2.  Effects of Solitary Confinement 
The potential harmful effects of solitary confinement were known as early 
as 1890.98  In In re Medley,99 the Supreme Court found that, while in solitary 
confinement, 
[a] considerable number of the prisoners fell, after even a short 
confinement, into a semi-fatuous condition, from which it was next to 
impossible to arouse them, and others became violently insane; others still, 
committed suicide; while those who stood the ordeal better were not 
 
 88. Victoria Law, Four Deadline Extensions Later, Teenagers Are Still Locked Up in 
Solitary on Rikers Island, VILLAGE VOICE (July 13, 2016, 10:00 AM), http:// 
www.villagevoice.com/news/four-deadline-extensions-later-teenagers-are-still-locked-up-in-
solitary-on-rikers-island-8856237 [http://perma.cc/W574-7MKG]. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See id. 
 91. See SHAMES ET AL., supra note 76, at 18 (“Colorado has decreased its use of segregated 
housing by 85 percent and prisoner-on-staff assaults are the lowest they have been since 
2006.”); see also N.Y.C. JAILS ACTION COAL., supra note 5, at 16 (“Punitive segregation 
fosters violence in DOC facilities and exacerbates threats to institutional security.”). 
 92. See SHAMES ET AL., supra note 76, at 12–14. 
 93. Chad S. Briggs et al., The Effect of Supermaximum Security Prisons on Aggregate 
Levels of Institutional Violence, 41 CRIMINOLOGY 1341, 1367–70 (2003). 
 94. See SHAMES ET AL., supra note 76, at 18; see also Grant Henderson, Comment, 
Disciplinary Segregation:  How the Punitive Solitary Confinement Policy in Federal Prisons 
Violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment in Spite of Sandin v. Conner, 99 
MARQ. L. REV. 477, 497–99 (2015). 
 95. Lindley A. Bassett, Note, The Constitutionality of Solitary Confinement:  Insights 
from Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs, 26 HEALTH MATRIX 403, 417 (2016). 
 96. See KIM ET AL., supra note 83, at 44. 
 97. Id. 
 98. In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 160 (1890). 
 99. 134 U.S. 160 (1890). 
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generally reformed, and in most cases did not recover sufficient mental 
activity to be of any subsequent service to the community.100 
Dr. Stuart Grassian, an expert on the effects of solitary confinement, 
addressed and rebuked concerns that the self-reports typically characterizing 
solitary confinement research might be exaggerated.101  He found that his 
interviewees actually rationalized and avoided full engagement with the 
extent of the deprivation they were facing until he probed further.102  For 
example, he reported that one of his interviewees rationalized his self-harm 
while in solitary confinement with a desire to leave.103 
Grassian found a pattern of initial denial and rationalization, progressing 
to overt anxiety once subjects were pressed through questioning.104  Some of 
the interviewees expressed fear that the guards would exploit their 
weaknesses or that they were, in fact, “going insane.”105  This research 
suggests that interviewees’ potential biases typically point toward a lack of 
acknowledgment of the practice’s effects as opposed to exaggeration. 
In his studies, Grassian identified a distinct psychiatric syndrome 
associated with solitary confinement, explaining that many of the associated 
symptoms are either rare or not found elsewhere.106  In his evaluation of 
forty-nine individuals incarcerated in Pelican Bay State Prison’s solitary 
confinement unit, he found that “at least seventeen were actively psychotic 
and/or acutely suicidal . . . , and twenty-three others suffered serious 
psychopathological reactions to solitary confinement.”107  The most severely 
affected by solitary confinement often suffer from delirium, hallucinations, 
and disorientation.108  In these mental states, individuals often dissociate and 
cannot recall what occurred.109 
Among the more resilient in Grassian’s sample—whom he described as 
highly educated and high functioning—he found symptoms of “perceptual 
disturbances, free-floating anxiety, and panic attacks.”110  Grassian 
concluded that the conditions inherent in solitary confinement “are strikingly 
toxic to mental functioning, producing a stuporous condition associated with 
perceptual and cognitive impairment and affective disturbances.”111 
A study conducted in Denmark demonstrated that individuals placed in 
solitary confinement experienced significantly higher incidences of 
 
 100. Id. at 168. 
 101. Stuart Grassian, Psychopathological Effects of Solitary Confinement, 140 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 1450, 1451 (1983). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. (quoting an interviewee who said, “As soon as I got in, I started cutting my wrists,” 
and “I figured it was the only way to get out of here”). 
 104. Id. at 1452. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See Grassian, supra note 81, at 337. 
 107. Id. at 349. 
 108. See id. at 332; see also Grassian, supra note 101, at 1452. 
 109. See Grassian, supra note 81, at 353. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 354. 
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psychiatric disorders than those in general population housing.112  The 
researchers found that individuals in solitary confinement were at a higher 
risk for developing adjustment disorders such as depression and anxiety, 
coupled with psychosomatic symptoms.113  Panic attacks, posttraumatic 
stress disorder, “chronic hyper-vigilance,” and obsessive thoughts are also 
symptomatic.114 
In solitary confinement, an individual’s emotional well-being also suffers.  
Humans are social creatures,115 and healthy brain functioning thrives on 
“social thinking and sensory interpretation.”116  People need “continuous 
meaningful contact with the outside world” to function.117  Health and well-
being improve with access to “close social relationships and rich social 
networks,” from which people in solitary confinement are necessarily 
restricted.118  Complete isolation, in many ways, can be worse than negative 
social interaction.119 
People who are isolated can suffer a great deal of emotional damage, 
cycling between “bitterness and despair.”120  They feel like incarceration is 
trying to “break” them and “describe a complete loss of control over their 
emotions.”121  Stemming from these thoughts, they also feel a tremendous 
amount of rage, resentment, and hopelessness.122 
Dr. Craig Haney identified five social pathologies that emerge from 
isolation:  dependence on the institution, inability to initiate behavior, a 
pervading “feeling of unreality,” frustration and anger, and social 
withdrawal,.123  Solitary confinement can also cause regression into primary 
 
 112. H.S. Andersen et al., A Longitudinal Study of Prisoners on Remand:  Psychiatric 
Prevalence, Incidence and Psychopathology in Solitary vs. Non-Solitary Confinement, 102 
ACTA PSYCHIATRICA SCANDINAVICA 19, 23 (2000) (finding that solitary confinement is “a 
significant risk factor for the development of non-psychotic psychiatric morbidity in 
comparison with imprisonment in [general population]”). 
 113. Id. 
 114. See Jacob Zoghlin, Punishments in Penal Institutions:  (Dis)-Proportionality in 
Isolation, 21 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 24, 26 (2014). 
 115. Bandy X. Lee & Maya Prabhu, A Reflection on the Madness in Prisons, 26 STAN. L. 
& POL’Y REV. 253, 260 (2015) (“Isolation can be more harmful than negative human contact 
because human beings are neurologically and psychologically social animals.  Social contact 
is like oxygen or food:  we do not notice how essential it is until we have known suffocation 
or hunger.”). 
 116. See Elizabeth Bennion, Banning the Bing:  Why Extreme Solitary Confinement Is 
Cruel and Far Too Unusual Punishment, 90 IND. L.J. 741, 755 (2015). 
 117. See Benjamin & Lux, supra note 69, at 270. 
 118. See Lane Beckes & James A. Coan, Social Baseline Theory:  The Role of Social 
Proximity in Emotion and Economy of Action, 5 SOC. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS 
976, 976 (2011); see also Abdul Rashid et al., The Influence of Social Support on Cognitive 
Impairment in the Elderly, 9 AUSTRALIAN MED. J. 262, 264 (2016) (finding that a lack of social 
support is a risk factor for cognitive heath and that “[e]lderly with good social support . . . are 
less likely to experience cognitive decline”). 
 119. See Lee & Prabhu, supra note 115, at 259 (“Still, negative human contact within 
prisons is better than no contact.”). 
 120. See Benjamin & Lux, supra note 69, at 277. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Craig Haney, Mental Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary and “Supermax” 
Confinement, 49 CRIME & DELINQ. 124, 138–40 (2003). 
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processes, consisting of “unrealistic, prelogical modes of thought, or 
[thoughts] which contain[] inappropriate drive intrusions.”124  Consistent 
with this regression are a lack of impulse control, fantasies of revenge, and 
paranoia.125 
Solitary confinement also impacts sensitivity to external stimuli.  One’s 
attention to the environment and levels of alertness are diminished during 
isolation.126  Those who are isolated may lose “perceptual constancy,” 
characterized by “objects becoming larger and smaller, seeming to ‘melt’ or 
change form, [and] sounds becoming louder and softer.”127  In addition, they 
demonstrate an extreme hypersensitivity to stimuli, which “become[] 
intensely unpleasant,” and report that “small irritations become 
maddening.”128 
Further, the effects of solitary confinement are physical.  Solitary 
confinement can be “as strong a risk factor for . . . mortality as are smoking, 
obesity, a sedentary lifestyle, and high blood pressure.”129  Solitary 
confinement also causes “sleep disturbances, headaches, lethargy, dizziness, 
heart palpitations, appetite loss, weight loss, severe digestive problems, 
diaphoresis, back and joint pain, deterioration of eyesight, shaking and 
feeling cold, and aggravation of pre-existing medical problems.”130 
The harm of solitary confinement is often permanent, even if symptoms 
subside over time after one’s release.131  This can have implications for 
successful reentry to society.132  In fact, prolonged isolation can cause lasting 
detrimental emotional damage and, in the worst cases, permanent “functional 
disability.”133  Harms associated with solitary confinement can become 
permanent even after a short duration.134 
Immediately after release from segregation, whether into general 
population housing or society, individuals demonstrate difficulties with 
adjustment.135  Solitary confinement can thus have a negative impact on 
public safety.  Jails, pretrial detention in particular, are designed for short-
term incarceration.136  The majority of people incarcerated pretrial will be 
released, and they will not be “well prepared to return to a social milieu.”137 
 
 124. See Benjamin & Lux, supra note 69, at 275. 
 125. Grassian, supra note 101, at 1453. 
 126. See Grassian, supra note 81, at 330. 
 127. Id. at 337. 
 128. Id. at 331. 
 129. Bennion, supra note 116, at 755. 
 130. Zoghlin, supra note 114, at 26. 
 131. See Grassian, supra note 81, at 332. 
 132. See Gordon, supra note 70, at 506–07. 
 133. Terry A. Kupers, What to Do with the Survivors?:  Coping with the Long-Term Effects 
of Isolated Confinement, 35 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 1005, 1006 (2008). 
 134. See Méndez, supra note 16, at 23 (stating that even a short duration in isolation can 
amount to torture). 
 135. Kupers, supra note 133, at 1010. 
 136. See, e.g., PETTERUTI & WALSH, supra note 47, at 5 (“[J]ails are intended to hold people 
who are at risk of reoffending, are unlikely to return for their court date, and/or are sentenced 
to a year or less.”). 
 137. Kupers, supra note 133, at 1011. 
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The permanence of the harm and the likelihood that individuals will 
develop psychiatric disorders render emerging adults especially vulnerable 
to the practice.  Further, emerging adults are the most likely age demographic 
to be exposed to solitary confinement in jail.138 
In his call to “banish” solitary confinement for juveniles in the United 
States, Professor Ian M. Kysel “suggest[s] that there are both practical and 
jurisprudential reasons for viewing children as different from adults when it 
comes to evaluating how the constitution protects them when they are 
deprived of their liberty” while incarcerated.139  The following section, 
through a discussion of the empirical research surrounding emerging 
adulthood, demonstrates that there are similar practical and jurisprudential 
reasons to view emerging adults differently. 
C.  Emerging Adulthood:  
A Critical Developmental Period 
With some exceptions, legal adulthood begins at the age of eighteen in the 
United States.140  However, many scholars reject the designation of eighteen 
as a marker of adulthood.141  Eighteen as legal adulthood is simply a default 
rule “unless the legislatures or courts have prescribed a higher or lower age 
in particular contexts.”142 
The age of responsibility depends on the context.  For example, in most 
states, foster care and parental support obligations end at the age of eighteen, 
but health insurance plans are mandated under parents’ health insurance 
coverage until the age of twenty-six.143  Between the ages of fourteen and 
sixteen, adolescents are able to make autonomous medical decisions, but 
alcohol consumption is prohibited until twenty-one.144  The age of criminal 
responsibility is eighteen in most states but can be as low as sixteen or 
seventeen in others.145 
Strict dividing lines are undoubtedly easier to enforce, but they ignore “the 
reality of human development, which occurs on a continuum.”146  Between 
the ages of eighteen and twenty-five, individuals are likely to experience 
more instability and unpredictability than those in different age groups.147 
 
 138. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 139. Ian M. Kysel, Banishing Solitary:  Litigating an End to the Solitary Confinement of 
Children in Jails and Prisons, 40 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 675, 679 (2016). 
 140. See Atwell, supra note 25, at 15. 
 141. See Melissa S. Caulum, Comment, Postadolescent Brain Development:  A Disconnect 
Between Neuroscience, Emerging Adults, and the Corrections System, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 729, 
732; see also David P. Farrington et al., Young Adult Offenders:  The Need for More Effective 
Legislative Options and Justice Processing, 11 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 729, 730 (2012). 
 142. Alexandra O. Cohen et al., When Does a Juvenile Become an Adult?:  Implications 
for Law and Policy, 88 TEMP. L. REV. 769, 770 (2016). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 776. 
 145. See Kysel, supra note 139, at 681. 
 146. See Atwell, supra note 25, at 15. 
 147. Id. at 19. 
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1.  Defining Emerging Adulthood 
Dr. Jeffrey Jensen Arnett identifies the period from adolescence through 
the twenties as a distinct stage of maturation.148  He argues that emerging 
adulthood is “theoretically and empirically distinct from” both adolescence 
and young adulthood, characterized by increased risk-taking.149  He also 
justifies defining emerging adulthood as a distinct developmental stage rather 
than a transitional period by indicating that seven years is a longer period 
than both infancy and adolescence.150 
Professor David Farrington and his colleagues look to justifications for 
treating juveniles as a protected, separate group to justify similarly protecting 
emerging adults.  Emerging adults, while distinct in many ways, are more 
similar to adolescents “with respect to features such as their executive 
functioning, impulse control, malleability, responsibility, susceptibility to 
peer influence, and adjudicative competence.”151  Results show that college-
aged individuals may be more similar to adolescents than older adults in their 
inclination to engage in “antisocial decision making.”152  These similarities 
justify treating emerging adults as a distinct midway group deserving of 
increased legal protection.153 
Some disagree with the calls for increased protection.  Professor John 
Lunstroth, for example, argues that the law should recognize formal, legal 
adulthood as early as fourteen.154  He is worried that arguments in favor of 
treating youth as less culpable could be damaging for the variety of rights 
youth should be entitled to in other contexts.155 
In the seminal case Roper v. Simmons156—which declared the death 
penalty unconstitutional when imposed on youth under the age of eighteen—
Justice Antonin Scalia dissented and was similarly perplexed by the 
disconnect among youth advocates.157  Justice Scalia pointed to the American 
Psychiatric Association’s brief in Roper—supporting a finding of diminished 
criminal liability for those who are under eighteen—as inconsistent with a 
prior brief in support of declaring youth under eighteen as competent to make 
decisions about obtaining an abortion.158 
 
 148. Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, Emerging Adulthood:  A Theory of Development from the Late 
Teens Through the Twenties, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 469, 469 (2000). 
 149. Id. at 469–75. 
 150. Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, Emerging Adulthood:  What Is It, and What Is It Good For?, 1 
CHILD DEV. PERSP. 68, 70 (2007). 
 151. See Farrington et al., supra note 141, at 741. 
 152. Kathryn Lynn Modecki, Addressing Gaps in the Maturity of Judgment Literature:  
Age Differences and Delinquency, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 78, 89 (2008) (researching a 
sample population of adolescents aged fourteen to seventeen, college-aged people eighteen to 
twenty-one, young adults twenty-two to twenty-seven, and adults twenty-eight to forty). 
 153. See Farrington et al., supra note 141, at 730. 
 154. John Lunstroth, Recognizing Younger Citizens:  Statutes and Structures in Support of 
Earlier Adulthood, 18 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 161, 164 (2014). 
 155. Id. (discussing a child’s ability to make decisions in relation to terminal illnesses, 
ability to vote, etc.). 
 156. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 157. Id. at 617–18 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 158. Id. 
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These seemingly incompatible arguments cease to be incompatible when 
emerging adulthood research is consulted.159  Developmental change 
depends on the outcome being assessed.160  For example, people “mature 
intellectually before they mature emotionally or socially,” with emotional 
and social maturation extending past the age of eighteen.161 
This Note does not argue that youth should not have the right to be 
independent agents.  Rather, it argues that emerging adults should not be 
subjected to a practice, especially absent a formal finding of guilt, that has 
demonstrated severe and permanent negative effects.  This argument is based 
on the evidence that emerging adults will often act rashly and take risks.162  
In other words, the argument is not that adolescents and emerging adults are 
wholly incapable of thinking for themselves and making their own decisions 
in all circumstances but that we should be concerned about how they are to 
be held accountable. 
2.  Increased Risk-Taking 
Emerging adults are more likely than both adolescents and older adults to 
engage in risky behavior.163  Rather than conceptualizing the age of eighteen 
as a marker of the end of an unstable developmental period, eighteen is more 
appropriate as the marker of the “beginning of a particularly problematic 
developmental phase.”164  The evidence that risk-taking actually peaks 
during emerging adulthood then begins to desist weakens the argument that 
eighteen-year-olds are embarking on a period of increased sensibility.165 
In one study, researchers found that most risky behaviors decrease from 
adolescence to adulthood, but the age at which they decline differs.166  While 
desistance from offending is typically related to the age of onset of criminal 
behavior, the early twenties mark the largest concentration of desisting 
 
 159. Laurence Steinberg et al., Are Adolescents Less Mature Than Adults?:  Minors’ Access 
to Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA “Flip-Flop,” 64 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 583, 586 (2009). 
 160. Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Young Adulthood as a Transitional Legal Category:  Science, 
Social Change, and Justice Policy, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 641, 648–49 (2016). 
 161. Id. at 648. 
 162. See infra Part I.C.2. 
 163. See Krisna N.K. Duangpatra et al., Variables Affecting Emerging Adults’ Self-
Reported Risk and Reckless Behaviors, 30 J. APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 298, 298 
(2009); see also Brandon G. Bergman et al., “The Age of Feeling In-Between”:  Addressing 
Challenges in the Treatment of Emerging Adults with Substance Use Disorders, 23 COGNITIVE 
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substance use disorders of any age group). 
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11 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 751, 752 (2012); see also Jeffrey J. Arnett et al., The New Life 
Stage of Emerging Adulthood at Ages 18–29 Years:  Implications for Mental Health, 1 LANCET 
PSYCHIATRY 569, 571 (2014) (“Emerging adulthood is arguably the most unstable period of 
the lifespan.”). 
 165. See Cauffman, supra note 164, at 752. 
 166. See Jeannette Brodbeck et al., Comparing Growth Trajectories of Risk Behaviors from 
Late Adolescence Through Young Adulthood:  An Accelerated Design, 49 DEVELOPMENTAL 
PSYCHOL. 1732, 1737 (2013). 
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regardless of the age of onset.167  By the midtwenties, approximately three-
quarters of all people who engage in criminal behavior are expected to stop 
engaging in such behavior altogether.168 
Self-control theory’s basic thesis is that the absence of self-control leads 
to criminal behavior.169  Researchers are increasingly finding that self-
control continues to change and develop into emerging adulthood.170  
Evidence of increased risk-taking among unincarcerated youth is a sign that 
the inherent stressors of incarceration could lead emerging adults to engage 
in the types of behaviors that may eventually cause their placement in solitary 
confinement. 
In a study of prison violence, researchers found that incarcerated people 
under the age of twenty-one were 3.5 times as likely to engage in violence, 
and people between the ages of twenty-one and twenty-five were 63 percent 
more likely to engage in violence than those between the ages of thirty-one 
and thirty-five.171  As age increases, people who are incarcerated are less 
likely to engage in violent behavior.172 
Professor Barbara Bennett Woodhouse cautions that the theory of 
emerging adulthood, encompassing identity exploration and risk-taking, is a 
privilege that only the middle and upper classes can enjoy.173  The increased 
vulnerabilities of emerging adulthood among those who do not have that 
privilege are similarly intensified during incarceration and solitary 
confinement.  Emerging adulthood is typically “characterized by myriad 
opportunities for greater autonomy and independent living that comes with 
reaching the age of majority.”174  Incarcerated emerging adults are 
necessarily foreclosed from this period of exploration because “‘growing up’ 
[incarcerated] creates a developmental bind.”175  It is imperative that they are 
not left behind. 
 
 167. See Farrington et al., supra note 141, at 734. 
 168. Andrew Michaels, A Decent Proposal:  Exempting Eighteen-to-Twenty-Year-Olds 
from the Death Penalty, 40 N.Y.U REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 139, 164 (2016). 
 169. Callie H. Burt et al., Self-Control Through Emerging Adulthood:  Instability, 
Multidimensionality, and Criminological Significance, 52 CRIMINOLOGY 450, 453–54 (2014). 
 170. Id. at 474. 
 171. Allison M. Schenk & William J. Fremouw, Individual Characteristics Related to 
Prison Violence:  A Critical Review of the Literature, 17 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 430, 
432 (2012). 
 172. Id. 
 173. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Youthful Indiscretions:  Culture, Class Status, and the 
Passage to Adulthood, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 743, 758 (2002). 
 174. See Bergman et al., supra note 163, at 270. 
 175. Joyce A. Arditti & Tiffaney Parkman, Young Men’s Reentry After Incarceration:  A 
Developmental Paradox, 60 FAM. REL. 205, 207, 215 (2011) (“Young adults who ‘grow up’ 
in prison are severely restricted in terms of having the opportunity and freedom to explore 
positive life directions, master social competence, and establish themselves in social structures 
necessary for status attainment.”). 
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3.  Increased Vulnerability to Negative Conditions 
Emerging adulthood is a challenge for “even the most well-adjusted 
youth.”176  Incarcerated emerging adults “have yet to establish conventional 
social ties, roles, and activities prior to their incarceration.”177  A failure to 
successfully navigate this developmental period can have lifelong effects.178  
Additionally, emerging adults are at a heightened risk for developing mental 
illnesses.179  Prevalence of a mental health disorder for individuals aged 
eighteen to twenty-nine is higher than any other age group.180 
Evidence suggests that stressful environments may actually be regressive.  
Youth aged eighteen to twenty-one behave more like adolescents when 
exposed to “negative emotional arousal.”181  Further, an emerging adult’s 
cognitive functioning is especially “vulnerable to negative emotional 
influences.”182  During emerging adulthood, individuals begin to develop and 
acquire both practical and interpersonal skills that will enable them to 
navigate adulthood more effectively.  Incarceration during this critical period 
in itself disrupts this development; solitary confinement will unmistakably 
aggravate this disruption. 
II.  PUNISHMENT:  A TERM OF ART 
The Supreme Court has stated, “Prison walls do not form a barrier 
separating prison inmates from the protections of the Constitution.”183  In 
keeping with this assertion, the Court has attempted to define the contours of 
the rights afforded to people who are incarcerated.  The Court held that the 
Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause applies only to 
people who are incarcerated following a conviction.184  Until 2015, there was 
no clear dividing line between standards applicable to pretrial incarceration 
and imprisonment.185 
Part II.A outlines the development of the Supreme Court’s prison 
jurisprudence, and Part II.B similarly tracks the development of the Supreme 
Court’s pretrial incarceration jurisprudence.186  While Kingsley v. 
Hendrickson187 held that claims of excessive force in pretrial detention are 
 
 176. See Zajac et al., supra note 27, at 139. 
 177. See Arditti & Parkman, supra note 175, at 205. 
 178. See id.; see also Zajac et al., supra note 27, at 140 (“The importance of this 
developmental period lies not only in key milestones but also in the risk for impediments.”). 
 179. See Zajac et al., supra note 27, at 140 (finding that a “majority of mental health 
disorders have onset by the early 20s”); see also Lee & Prabhu, supra note 115, at 262 (finding 
that “schizophrenia and bipolar disorder[] most often have their onset during adolescence or 
early adulthood”). 
 180. See Arnett et al., supra note 164, at 569. 
 181. See Cohen et al., supra note 142, at 786. 
 182. Id. at 787. 
 183. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987). 
 184. City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 243–44 (1983). 
 185. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015). 
 186. Id. 
 187. 135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015). 
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subject to an objective rather than subjective test,188 it is still unclear whether 
the Kingsley test is applicable in other contexts and factual circumstances.189  
Part II.C explains lower courts’ conflation of pretrial incarceration and 
imprisonment claims prior to Kingsley and demonstrates the risk that this 
conflation will continue if Kingsley’s holding is confined to its facts. 
A.  The Eighth Amendment and Imprisonment 
The Court repeatedly grounds its prison jurisprudence on the fact that the 
complainants have been convicted of a crime.190  Additionally, the Court 
continually emphasizes a rigorous deference to prison administrators.191  The 
Court concretized this deference in Turner v. Safley.192  The majority was 
wary of the competing interests of protecting the rights of incarcerated 
individuals and exercising judicial restraint.193  For this reason, the Court 
articulated the following standard:  “[W]hen a prison regulation impinges on 
inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related 
to legitimate penological interests.”194  While there must be a logical 
connection between the regulation that curtails fundamental rights and its 
stated goals,195 the Court also reinforced the suggestion that prison officials 
are experts who should have the latitude to make decisions qualified by that 
expertise.196 
The Supreme Court, mindfully exercising restraint, developed its 
jurisprudence to safeguard the rights of people who are incarcerated 
postconviction so that they are not subjected to cruel and unusual 
punishment.  Today, prison officials must act with subjective deliberate 
indifference to a person’s health or safety to be found liable.197  Further, 
solitary confinement in itself does not trigger a protected liberty interest 
unless it amounts to an “atypical, significant deprivation.”198 
 
 188. Id. at 2475 (emphasizing that respondents’ assertion that the applicable standard 
should be subjective fails due to their reliance on Eighth Amendment jurisprudence). 
 189. See id. at 2473 (maintaining that the objective standard should not be applied 
“mechanically”). 
 190. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 561–63 (1974) (referencing lawful 
conviction status as a justification for the articulated procedural protections). 
 191. See, e.g., supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 192. 482 U.S. 78 (1987). 
 193. Id. at 84–85. 
 194. Id. at 89. 
 195. Id. at 89–91 (maintaining that the goals must be objective but that courts can also take 
account of whether there are other avenues for complainants to assert constitutional rights, 
whether allowing a complainant to assert those rights will have a “ripple effect” on others, and 
whether there are “ready alternatives” to the regulation). 
 196. See id. at 84–85 (“Running a prison is an inordinately difficult undertaking that 
requires expertise.”); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974) (deferring to the 
“professional expertise of corrections officials”). 
 197. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). 
 198. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 486 (1995). 
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1.  Culpable State of Mind:  
Subjective Deliberate Indifference 
The Supreme Court first presented the subjective deliberate indifference 
standard in a claim alleging unconstitutionally inadequate medical care.199  
The Court found that the Eighth Amendment “proscribes more than 
physically barbarous punishments” and extends an obligation to the 
government to “provide medical care for those whom it is punishing by 
incarceration.”200  The Court found an affirmative duty in the prison context 
because people who are incarcerated cannot turn elsewhere for medical 
care.201  Accidents and “inadvertent failure[s]” to provide care, however, will 
not constitute violations of the Eighth Amendment, despite the level of pain 
and suffering that might ensue as a result.202  The Court emphasized that 
officials may not be found liable for mere negligence.203 
The Court additionally refused to distinguish between short-term 
conditions of confinement and “systemic” conditions.204  In Wilson v. 
Seiter,205 the plaintiff alleged that one-time conditions should have a culpable 
state of mind requirement but in continuous conditions, a prison official’s 
state of mind should be irrelevant.206  In response, the Supreme Court wrote: 
We perceive neither a logical nor a practical basis for that distinction.  The 
source of the intent requirement is not the predilections of this Court, but 
the Eighth Amendment itself, which bans only cruel and unusual 
punishment.  If the pain inflicted is not formally meted out as punishment 
by the statute or the sentencing judge, some mental element must be 
attributed to the inflicting officer before it can qualify.207 
The Court thus reiterated that a subjective inquiry is required in cases alleging 
unconstitutional conditions of confinement.208 
The Court was once again tasked with answering whether the deliberate 
indifference standard is objective or subjective in a failure-to-protect 
claim.209  Dee Farmer—a transgender woman who was sometimes housed in 
general population with cisgender men but more often segregated—brought 
a civil suit alleging deliberately indifferent failure to protect her from 
harm.210  Within two weeks of a transfer to general population in March of 
1989, Farmer was physically and sexually assaulted by another incarcerated 
 
 199. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835 (noting that the term “deliberate indifference” was first used 
in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)). 
 200. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102–03. 
 201. Id. at 103. 
 202. Id. at 105–06 (“Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely 
because the victim is a prisoner.”). 
 203. Id. at 106. 
 204. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 300–01 (1991). 
 205. 501 U.S. 294 (1991). 
 206. Id. at 300. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 301–03. 
 209. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). 
 210. Id. at 829–32. 
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person in her cell.211  Farmer’s complaint alleged that she was placed in 
general population housing despite the officers’ knowledge of the violent 
environment and history of assault and despite knowledge that her 
appearance and gender identity would make her especially vulnerable.212 
The Supreme Court conceded that officials have a duty to ensure that those 
in their care are protected from violence at the hands of other people who are 
incarcerated.213  However, not every injury suffered at the hands of another 
constitutes a violation of the Eighth Amendment.214  The Court established a 
two-part test:  the alleged deprivation “must be, objectively, ‘sufficiently 
serious’” and the official alleged to have caused the deprivation must be 
subjectively deliberately indifferent to the individual’s health or safety.215 
The Court rejected Farmer’s contention that deliberate indifference is a 
solely objective test.216  The Court instead held that “a prison official cannot 
be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane 
conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an 
excessive risk to inmate health or safety.”217  The Court did not hold that the 
official must know that harm is inevitable.218  A failure to act despite 
“knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm” suffices to satisfy 
deliberate indifference.219 
2.  Solitary Confinement in the Context of Prison Discipline:  
Liberty and Procedural Due Process 
The standards articulated in Estelle v. Gamble220 and Farmer v. 
Brennan221 establish rights afforded to incarcerated people in claims arising 
out of the conditions of their confinement.  During their incarceration, 
individuals may also be disciplined for various reasons.  The Supreme Court 
accords prison officials discretion in discipline and allows them to place 
individuals in solitary confinement to “effectuate[] prison management and 
prisoner rehabilitative goals.”222 
Sandin v. Conner223 is a leading case addressing solitary confinement in 
the prison context.  In response to disrespectful language directed at an 
officer, DeMont Conner was issued a disciplinary infraction and 
subsequently sentenced to thirty days in disciplinary segregation.224  Conner 
 
 211. Id. at 830. 
 212. Id. at 831. 
 213. Id. at 833. 
 214. Id. at 834. 
 215. Id. (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). 
 216. Id. at 837. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. at 842. 
 219. Id. 
 220. 429 U.S. 97 (1976). 
 221. 511 U.S. 825 (1994). 
 222. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485 (1995). 
 223. 515 U.S. 472 (1995). 
 224. Id. at 475–76. 
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alleged that his segregation encroached on a protected liberty interest.225  The 
Supreme Court disagreed, distinguishing the rights of those who are 
convicted from those who are incarcerated pretrial.226  The Court found that 
“[d]iscipline by prison officials in response to a wide range of misconduct 
falls within the expected perimeters of the sentence imposed by a court of 
law.”227 
The Supreme Court held that liberty interests are triggered by “atypical, 
significant deprivation[s].”228  The Court subsequently found that thirty days 
in disciplinary segregation did not constitute an atypical and significant 
hardship and therefore did not encroach upon Conner’s liberty interests in 
violation of the Eighth Amendment.229 
To ensure that individuals are not arbitrarily deprived of their liberty, the 
Supreme Court outlined minimum procedural protections in Wolff v. 
McDonnell.230  The Court justified its holding on the basis of the 
complainant’s criminal conviction.  The Court wrote:  “Prison disciplinary 
proceedings . . . take place in a closed, tightly controlled environment 
peopled by those who have chosen to violate the criminal law and who have 
been lawfully incarcerated for doing so.”231 
Additionally, the Court acknowledged the often tense relationship between 
people who are incarcerated and prison staff.232  To balance the competing 
interests of ensuring that individuals are not arbitrarily disciplined and 
allowing officials to effectively manage their facilities and people in their 
custody, the Court established that individuals who are charged with a 
disciplinary infraction are entitled to a hearing prior to being sanctioned.233 
The Court outlined the following additional minimum protections:  the 
individual is entitled to written notice, time to prepare for a disciplinary 
hearing (no less than twenty-four hours), a written statement by the fact-
finders communicating the reasons for the infraction, and the right to call 
witnesses should the hearing administrator determine that doing so will not 
be “unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals.”234  An 
 
 225. Id. at 484. 
 226. Id. at 484–85. 
 227. Id. at 485. 
 228. Id. at 486. 
 229. Id. at 487. 
 230. 418 U.S. 539 (1974). 
 231. Id. at 561. 
 232. Id. at 562. 
 233. Id. at 557–58. 
 234. Id. at 564–66. 
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individual facing disciplinary charges has no right to counsel235 and no right 
to cross-examine witnesses.236 
All of the above cases were decided with the explicit acknowledgment that 
the complainants were lawfully incarcerated pursuant to a conviction.  
Consequently, their application to claims brought by individuals who are 
incarcerated pretrial should be avoided. 
B.  Substantive Due Process and Pretrial Incarceration 
The Supreme Court’s deference to prison administrators is clear.237  The 
Court is similarly deferential to jail administrators.238  In a series of cases, 
the Court, articulating and fine-tuning the standard applicable to people who 
are incarcerated pretrial, maintained that administrators are similarly best 
suited to make security and other considerations.239 
The touchstone of the Supreme Court’s pretrial incarceration jurisprudence 
is the doctrine of substantive due process.  Embedded in the right to “due 
process of law”240 is the notion that adequate process can safeguard 
individuals from arbitrary government action.241  The Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments guarantee individuals the right to “due process of law,” which 
appears to guarantee “only procedural protection.”242  However, the Due 
Process Clause also contains a substantive element.243  Individuals have the 
right to be free from arbitrary government action “regardless of the fairness 
of the procedures used to implement them.”244 
 
 235. Id. at 570 (“The insertion of counsel into the disciplinary process would inevitably 
give the proceedings a more adversary cast and tend to reduce their utility as a means to further 
correctional goals.  There would also be delay and very practical problems in providing 
counsel in sufficient numbers at the time and place where hearings are to be held.  At this stage 
of the development of these procedures we are not prepared to hold that inmates have a right 
to either retained or appointed counsel in disciplinary proceedings.”). 
 236. Id. at 567 (“Confrontation and cross-examination present greater hazards to 
institutional interests.  If confrontation and cross-examination of those furnishing evidence 
against the inmate were to be allowed as a matter of course, as in criminal trials, there would 
be considerable potential for havoc inside the prison walls.  Proceedings would inevitably be 
longer and tend to unmanageability.”). 
 237. See Struve, supra note 39, at 1015. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. 
 240. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law . . . .”); id. amend. XIV (“No state shall . . . deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”). 
 241. See Rosalie Berger Levinson, Protection Against Government Abuse of Power:  Has 
the Court Taken the Substance out of Substantive Due Process, 16 U. DAYTON L. REV. 313, 
313 (1991) (“Although on its face, the due process clause appears to assure only procedural 
protection, the United States Supreme Court has long recognized that the clause contains a 
substantive element as well.”). 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331–32 (1986); see also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 
U.S. 651, 672–73 (1977) (“The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, later 
incorporated into the Fourteenth, was intended to give Americans at least the protection 
against governmental power that they had enjoyed as Englishmen against the power of the 
Crown.  The liberty preserved from deprivation without due process included the right 
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1.  The Right to Be Free from Punishment:  
Bell v. Wolfish and Its Progeny 
In 1979, the Supreme Court decided Bell v. Wolfish,245 the seminal case 
legally differentiating between people who are incarcerated awaiting 
resolution of their cases and those who are incarcerated following a 
conviction.246  People incarcerated pretrial at the Metropolitan Correction 
Center—a federal jail in New York—brought a class action challenging the 
conditions of their confinement.247 
The Supreme Court noted that the government’s interest in detaining 
individuals prior to trial is legitimate and not at issue in deciding conditions 
of confinement claims.248  The Court held that the issue in such cases “is the 
detainee’s right to be free from punishment.”249  The prevailing standard is 
whether conditions complained of amount to punishment “in the 
constitutional sense.”250  The Court elaborated that “[n]ot every disability 
imposed during pretrial detention” will amount to unconstitutional 
punishment.251 
Courts must determine whether the disability complained of has a punitive 
purpose or whether it is related to a reasonable governmental interest.252  
Absent an express intent to punish, a regulation, procedure, or policy may be 
considered punitive if there is no rationally related purpose or if it “appears 
excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned [to it].”253  One 
legitimate interest that the Supreme Court stresses is a jail’s interest in 
maintaining order and security.254 
The standard, as articulated in Bell, was vague, and the lack of a precise 
dividing line between constitutional and unconstitutional conditions of 
confinement in pretrial detention “provided few details to guide future 
cases.”255  In 1984, the Court reiterated that the articulated right to be free 
from punishment is qualified by great deference to jail administrators.256  A 
jail’s denial of contact visits even to people who are low risk was considered 
a legitimate and reasonable interest in light of the risk of smuggling 
contraband and the risk of harm to innocent visitors.257  Additionally, the 
 
‘generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly 
pursuit of happiness by free men.’” (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923))). 
 245. 441 U.S. 520 (1979). 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. at 523–24. 
 248. Id. at 533–34. 
 249. Id. at 534. 
 250. Id. at 537. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. at 538. 
 253. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 
168–69 (1963)). 
 254. Id. at 540.  The use of solitary confinement is often rationalized as a method necessary 
to ensure jail security. See supra Part I.B. 
 255. See Struve, supra note 39, at 1015–18. 
 256. Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 591 (1984). 
 257. Id. at 586. 
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Court decided that the practice of conducting cell searches while individuals 
are away from their cells does not violate due process.258 
The Supreme Court did not address another pretrial detention condition-
of-confinement claim until 2012 in Florence v. Board of Chosen 
Freeholders.259  The Court, once again deferring to administrators, upheld a 
jail’s practice of strip-searching newly admitted individuals.260 
2.  Kingsley v. Hendrickson:  
Pretrial Incarceration’s Objective Standard 
Kingsley is the most recent case addressing the rights of people in pretrial 
detention.  The complainant, Michael Kingsley, alleged that he was the 
victim of excessive force.261  Some facts were disputed, but all parties agreed 
that Sergeant Hendrickson placed his knee in Kingsley’s back (while he was 
still handcuffed), that Kingsley impolitely told him to get off, and that Deputy 
Sheriff Degner tased Kingsley.262 
The Court faced the following issue:  Must a plaintiff prove an officer’s 
culpable state of mind to prove that the officer’s use of force amounted to 
unconstitutional punishment?263  The Court held that a plaintiff is not 
required to prove an officer’s state of mind to succeed.264  According to the 
Court, a person who is incarcerated pretrial “must show only that the force 
purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable.”265 
The Supreme Court clarified Bell’s holding, explaining that objective 
evidence alone is sufficient to establish that an official act is not “rationally 
related to a legitimate governmental objective or that it is excessive in 
relation to that purpose.”266  Additionally, the Court affirmatively 
distinguished between excessive force claims brought by those who are 
incarcerated postconviction and those who are incarcerated pretrial.267  In 
doing so, the Court emphasized that people who are incarcerated pretrial 
“cannot be punished at all, much less ‘maliciously and sadistically.’”268 
Continuing in its tradition of deference to administrators, the Court wrote 
that the objective reasonableness consideration is fact specific.269  Thus, this 
holding does not categorically apply to all types of claims brought by people 
who are incarcerated pretrial.  There is still a risk that circuit courts, even 
after Kingsley, may continue to apply standards established in the prison 
context to the pretrial context. 
 
 258. Id. at 589–92. 
 259. 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012). 
 260. Id. at 1523. 
 261. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2470 (2015). 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. at 2472. 
 265. Id. at 2473. 
 266. Id. at 2473–74. 
 267. Id. at 2475. 
 268. Id. (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 n.40 (1977)). 
 269. Id. at 2473. 
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C.  Applying the Objective Standard to Other Factual Circumstances:  
Kingsley’s Fact-Specific Nature 
Citing Bell, the Supreme Court found that the rights of individuals who 
have been injured in the course of an arrest “are at least as great as the Eighth 
Amendment protections available to” a person who is incarcerated following 
a conviction.270  Following this logic, many circuit courts conflated claims 
brought by people who are incarcerated regardless of their conviction 
status.271 
Prior to Kingsley, the First,272 Fourth,273 Sixth,274 Eighth,275 Ninth,276 and 
Tenth277 Circuits treated claims brought by incarcerated people the same 
regardless of conviction.  Illustrative of the risk that this conflation may 
continue in claims that do not allege excessive use of force is Ruiz-Bueno v. 
Scott.278  Ruiz-Bueno was decided shortly after Kingsley but applied 
Farmer’s subjective deliberate indifference standard.279 
The Sixth Circuit found that people who are incarcerated pretrial are 
“protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.”280  Yet, the 
court simultaneously held that “Supreme Court precedents governing 
prisoners’ Eighth Amendment rights also govern the Fourteenth Amendment 
 
 270. City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983). 
 271. See generally Struve, supra note 39; see also David C. Gorlin, Note, Evaluating 
Punishment in Purgatory:  The Need to Separate Pretrial Detainees’ Conditions-of-
Confinement Claims from Inadequate Eighth Amendment Analysis, 108 MICH. L. REV 417 
(2009). 
 272. See, e.g., Ford v. Bender, 768 F.3d 15, 24 (1st Cir. 2014); Surprenant v. Rivas, 424 
F.3d 5, 18 (1st Cir. 2005) (stating that unconstitutional conditions of confinement alleged by 
people who are incarcerated pretrial “implicate[] Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests,” 
but the “parameters of such an interest are coextensive with those of the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment”); Collazo-Leon v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 
51 F.3d 315, 318 (1st Cir. 1995). 
 273. See, e.g., Hause v. Vaught, 993 F.2d 1079, 1082 (4th Cir. 1993) (“[T]he concern for 
security is the same for pretrial detainees as for convicted inmates.”); Hill v. Nicodemus, 979 
F.2d 987, 991–92 (4th Cir. 1992). 
 274. See, e.g., Phillips v. Roane County, 534 F.3d 531, 539–40 (6th Cir. 2008) (applying 
Farmer’s subjective deliberate indifference standard to an allegation of inadequate medical 
care brought by a person who was incarcerated pretrial). 
 275. See, e.g., Walton v. Dawson, 752 F.3d 1109, 1117 (8th Cir. 2014) (using Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence to require subjective deliberate indifference in excessive force 
cases brought by people who are incarcerated pretrial); Smith v. Copeland, 87 F.3d 265, 269 
(8th Cir. 1996) (holding that Smith’s claim that overflowing raw sewage violated his 
constitutional rights should be dismissed “whether analyzed under Eighth Amendment or Due 
Process jurisprudence”). 
 276. See, e.g., Pierce v. County of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2008); Demery v. 
Arpaio, 378 F.3d 1020, 1030 (9th Cir. 2004); Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 
1441 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 277. Blackmon v. Sutton, 734 F.3d 1237, 1240 (10th Cir. 2013) (holding that rights 
afforded to persons incarcerated pretrial are at least the same as those afforded to persons 
incarcerated postconviction). 
 278. 639 F. App’x 354 (6th Cir. 2016). 
 279. Id. at 362 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994)) (writing that the plaintiff’s 
argument alleging unconstitutional conditions of confinement “does not square with the 
language of Farmer”); see also Bloom v. Pompa, 654 F. App’x 930, 934 (10th Cir. 2016) 
(finding that deliberate indifference in the pretrial context mirrors Farmer’s standards). 
 280. Ruiz-Bueno, 639 F. App’x at 358. 
2942 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
rights” of people who are incarcerated pretrial.281  Applying Farmer, the 
court required that each individual involved in an alleged constitutional 
violation must act with subjective deliberate indifference.282 
It is possible that the court’s decision was based, at least in part, on the 
factual differences between Ruiz-Bueno and Kingsley.  Some of the lower 
courts have not applied Kingsley to different factual circumstances, 
referencing the opinion’s fact-specific language.283  Other courts have 
expressed uncertainty over whether Kingsley applies to different 
circumstances but declined to make a decision.284 
For future claims alleging that isolating emerging adults who are 
incarcerated pretrial infringes on a protected liberty interest and is 
unconstitutionally punitive, lower courts may be compelled to apply Sandin’s 
atypical and significant hardship test.  Fortunately, some circuits have already 
held that Sandin does not apply to claims brought by people who are 
incarcerated pretrial.285  Additionally, the justification in Sandin is explicitly 
based on the fact that the complainant was convicted of a crime.286 
Wolff may also pose a barrier to successful litigation in this area.  The 
significant risk of permanent, adverse psychological, emotional, and physical 
effects for incarcerated emerging adults and the differentiation between 
individuals who are incarcerated pretrial and postconviction warrant a 
finding that subjecting emerging adults who are incarcerated pretrial to 
solitary confinement is itself objectively unreasonable punishment 
proscribed by substantive due process.  In other words, this practice is 
unconstitutionally punitive “regardless of the fairness of the procedures used 
to implement [it].”287 
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III.  OBJECTIVELY UNREASONABLE PUNISHMENT:  
ISOLATING EMERGING ADULTS IN PRETRIAL DETENTION 
The minimal procedural protections in Wolff were based, in part, on the 
fact that the complainant was convicted of a crime and subsequently 
imprisoned.288  Additionally, these protections are truly minimal, giving rise 
to the risk that individuals will be wrongfully disciplined.289  The standard 
articulated in Kingsley should thus extend to conditions of confinement 
cases.290  The Supreme Court emphasized that jail and prison litigation must 
be assessed on a case-by-case basis,291 but it makes practical sense to apply 
the same objective standard to the context at issue in this Note. 
The Court in Kingsley rested its objective standard on precedent: 
We have said that “the Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee from 
the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment.”  And in Bell we 
explained that such “punishment” can consist of actions taken with an 
“expressed intent to punish.”  But the Bell Court went on to explain that, in 
the absence of an expressed intent to punish, a pretrial detainee can 
nevertheless prevail by showing that the actions are not “rationally related 
to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental purpose” or that the actions 
“appear excessive in relation to that purpose.”  The Bell Court applied this 
latter objective standard to evaluate a variety of prison conditions, including 
a prison’s practice of double-bunking.  In doing so, it did not consider the 
prison officials’ subjective beliefs about the policy.  Rather, the Court 
examined objective evidence.292 
Perhaps the most compelling argument in support of finding that the 
standard for conditions-of-confinement cases must be objective is Justice 
Scalia’s dissent in Kingsley.293  Justice Scalia disagreed that excessive use of 
force claims brought by people who are incarcerated pretrial should be 
subject to an objective standard.294  He argued that the “reasonable relation” 
test established in Bell was limited to challenges of conditions of 
confinement.295 
 
 288. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 561–63 (1974) (“Prison disciplinary 
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According to Justice Scalia, it is more consistent with the Court’s 
precedent to apply an objective test to allegations of unconstitutional 
conditions of confinement than to allegations of excessive force.296  Given 
that the law now only requires an objective inquiry into the punitive nature 
of an officer’s use of force,297 it follows that, to be consistent with the Court’s 
precedent, the same should apply to pretrial conditions-of-confinement cases. 
Consistent with this proposition, the Second Circuit recently found that 
Kingsley “altered the standard for deliberate indifference claims under the 
Due Process Clause” and extended the Supreme Court’s holding to 
conditions-of-confinement claims.298  The court held that in challenging 
conditions-of-confinement in pretrial detention, two elements must be met:  
the alleged deprivation must be objectively sufficiently serious and the 
defendant must act with deliberate indifference.299  The Second Circuit 
decided to apply an objective deliberate indifference standard.300 
The Second Circuit followed Kingsley and held that the plaintiff does not 
have to prove the defendant’s state of mind.301  In particular, the court found: 
Unlike a violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, an official 
can violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment without 
meting out any punishment, which means that the Due Process Clause can 
be violated when an official does not have subjective awareness that the 
official’s acts (or omissions) have subjected the pretrial detainee to a 
substantial risk of harm.302 
Other circuits should follow the Second Circuit’s finding that a person who 
is incarcerated pretrial “may not be punished at all under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, whether through the use of excessive force, by deliberate 
indifference to conditions of confinement, or otherwise.”303 
The decision to place an individual in solitary confinement is the “result of 
considered deliberation by the authority imposing the detention” and is thus 
a condition of confinement.304  Looking back to Bell, subjecting emerging 
adults to solitary confinement during pretrial detention is excessive in 
relation to the governmental purposes assigned to it.305  Whether an emerging 
adult is isolated for disciplinary or administrative purposes, the harm is often 
irreparable, and the practice has no demonstrated effect on institutional 
violence.306  If there is an effect, it is typically that individuals become more 
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violent once released from solitary confinement, and institutional violence 
may actually increase as a result of the practice.307 
Deference to jail administrators in this context does not take account of the 
nature of pretrial incarceration and the harm of isolation at such a critical 
developmental phase.308  Given that jails are locally (and less) funded and 
often cite a lack of funding as a significant issue impeding reform, jail 
officials are typically even less qualified and trained than prison officials.309 
Such a reality gives weight to Eric Berger’s contention that “[t]he Court’s 
deference . . . is premised on institutional grounds without sufficient 
examination of the actual institutional practices at issue.”310  Deference based 
on the contention that jail staff and administrators are experts simply cannot 
be squared with the reality that many of them actually lack the appropriate 
expertise necessary to make such judgments. 
Because the vast majority of jails operate on the county level,311 advocates 
and rulemaking bodies should compel jail administrators to eradicate solitary 
confinement for individuals under the age of twenty-five.312  Litigation 
challenging the placement of emerging adults in solitary confinement while 
they are incarcerated pretrial may also compel localities to eliminate the 
practice.313 
In the prison context, courts have been reluctant to find psychological 
effects of isolated confinement actionable due to their “invisible” nature314 
and the subjective prong required in Farmer.315  The same barrier should not 
exist in the pretrial context post-Kingsley, where the standard is objective. 
In Davis v. Ayala,316 Justice Kennedy critiqued the use of solitary 
confinement and wrote:  “In a case that presented the issue, the judiciary may 
be required, within its proper jurisdiction and authority, to determine whether 
workable alternative systems for long-term confinement exist, and, if so, 
whether a correctional system should be required to adopt them.”317  The 
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intersection of pretrial incarceration and emerging adulthood presents a 
compelling argument that courts should abolish the practice of solitary 
confinement. 
CONCLUSION 
The potential for irreversible adverse health effects at the intersection of 
solitary confinement and emerging adulthood requires that the rights of 
emerging adults who are incarcerated pretrial be safeguarded with urgency.  
Isolating emerging adults who are incarcerated pretrial amounts to 
unconstitutional punishment.  The risk of developing mental illnesses during 
emerging adulthood renders placing emerging adults in solitary confinement 
a “practice of illness generation.”318 
As such, the practice should be abolished and meaningful alternatives to 
addressing violence, order, and safety should be put into place.  Should they 
need to be isolated as a last resort and in response to a violent act, emerging 
adults should be isolated only for a “cool-down” period after a consultation 
with a mental health professional.319  Additionally, staff who interact 
regularly with emerging adults “should receive training on young adult brain 
development, and appropriate de-escalation tactics.”320 
Such an approach is consistent with the Supreme Court’s customary 
caution of balancing the rights of people who are incarcerated and 
administrators.  Ensuring that emerging adults’ mental, emotional, and 
physical health is not damaged allows jail administrators to develop new 
practices that both nurture developmental growth and potentially make 
people less violent.321 
The human cost is also tremendous.  People who are incarcerated “retain 
the essence of human dignity inherent in all persons.”322  It is time that jails 
in the United States work toward ensuring that emerging adults retain their 
dignity.  As Johnny Perez implores:  “For every single day we wait, we risk—
and are—damaging the people who are sitting in those cells.  How can we 
continue to put people’s humanity on hold?”323 
 
 318. See Lee & Prabhu, supra note 115, at 262. 
 319. While the Department of Justice recommends this practice for juveniles, the same 
practice should apply for emerging adults in response to an immediate risk of harm. See U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING THE USE OF RESTRICTIVE 
HOUSING 101 (2016), https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/file/815551/download [https:// 
perma.cc/M7U3-7P8J]; see also JAMES GILLIGAN & BANDY LEE, REPORT TO THE NEW YORK 
CITY BOARD OF CORRECTION (2013), http://nycjac.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Gilligan-
Report-Final.pdf (“Seclusion should be used only as a last resort when no less restrictive 
alternative appears to be capable of preventing violence, and then for only as long as the inmate 
appears to continue to represent an immediate or short-term danger to himself or others.”) 
[http://perma.cc/6K62-5HD9]. 
 320. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 319, at 102. 
 321. See id. 
 322. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011). 
 323. Law, supra note 88. 
